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This Is Not a Game:  Violent Video Games, 
Sacred Space, and Ritual 
Rachel Wagner 
Some things have to be believed to be seen. 
—Ralph Hodgson 
  
Video games, especially those with religious content, create something similar 
to sacred space.  They can, like sacred spaces, provide a sense of orientation via 
the assumption of an ordered cosmos with predictable rules.  They too can frame 
discrete spatial elements, and sometimes even attempt to map the rules of the 
circumscribed space onto reality.  They focus desire by presenting us with a 
symbolic arena in which designers have predetermined how things should work.  
In those video games that intersect directly with religion via symbolism or    
depiction of real sacred space, the game itself also often functions as a sort of 
sacred space, with many of the same features and symbolic, ideological       
functions.  If the deliberate circumscribing of space is a means by which humans 
map order onto reality, then looking at video games as having ritual and spatial 
components seems an apt means of uncovering their ideological potential. 
In the middle of the twentieth century, long before video games were even        
imagined as a mode of popular entertainment, religious theorist Mircea Eliade    
argued that the recognition of the “sacred” within the “profane” world is a kind of 
order-making activity, offering a “hierophany” that reveals “an absolute fixed point, 
a center” within otherwise chaotic space (21).  For Eliade, “to organize a space is to 
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repeat the paradigmatic work of the gods” (32).  The creation and maintenance of 
sacred space is a way of rejecting the chaos of ordinary life, of symbolically arguing 
instead for an ordered cosmos, represented symbolically by the ordered area of the 
sacred space itself, set apart from the rest of life. Much more recently, media theorist 
Ken Hillis has expressed a similar sentiment about virtual reality’s ability to induce 
our sense of desire, transcendence, and the ideal.  Hillis notes an idealization of   
virtual reality, marked by “a widespread belief that space (understood variously as 
distance, extension, or orientation) constitutes something elemental.”  Virtual reality 
lulls us into thinking that the space behind the screen is real, since it “reflects support 
for a belief that because light illuminates space it may therefore produce space a 
priori.”  The illusion of space registers for us as real space.  As a result, says Hillis, 
users of virtual reality “may experience desire or even something akin to a          
moral imperative to enter into virtuality where space and light …have become one 
immaterial ‘wherein.’”  We are motivated by the desire for a “sense of entry into the 
image” and encouraged to view the screen and its mechanisms as a “transcendence 
machine” or “subjectivity enhancer,” that “works to collapse distinctions between 
the conceptions built into virtual environments by their developers and the percep-
tive faculties of users” (“Modes of Digital Identification” 349).  That is, the technol-
ogy encourages us to see virtual reality as more “real” than reality. 
Brenda Brasher similarly observes in cyberspace what she calls “omni-
temporality,” that is, “the religious idea of eternity as perpetual persistence” (52).  
Although the notion of “omnitemporality” first manifested as a religious notion, the 
“concrete expression or materialization of the monks’ concept of eternity,” it finds 
new expression today in wired culture.  Cyberspace, like the religious notion of the     
infinite, “is always present.”  It mimics much older ideas about heaven, since “what-
ever exists within [cyberspace] never decays.  Whatever is expressed in [it] … is  
perpetually expressed … the quasi-mystical appeal that cyberspace exudes stems 
from this taste of eternity that it imparts to those who interact with it” (52).  Virtual 
reality proposes a means of crossing beyond the vicissitudes of ordinary life into an 
“immaterial ‘wherein’” of imagined permanence and the fulfillment of dreams.   
Virtual reality promises, at times, to work as a kind of sacred space itself.1  Hillis and 
Brasher are speaking of virtual reality in its most general sense, as a sort of imagined 
ideal space behind the screen.  But the notion of a space that is set apart for symbolic 
activities applies even more powerfully to the study of video games, which are set 
apart not only by the screen but also by the activities that take place within that 
screen.  In this way, video games mark themselves as “scripted” experiences that 
share some important features with the “scripted” experience of ritual, both of which 
take place in circumscribed spaces set apart from ordinary life. 
Traditional theorists of sacred space emphasize the importance both of the place 
in which sacred symbolic activity occurs and the kind of symbolic activity that   
happens there.  Ritual and sacred spaces, then, are closely related theoretical        
concepts.  By considering the many ways that sacred space and video games overlap 
as symbolic spaces of ritualized order-making, this discussion will open the way to 
consider what happens when games work as sacred spaces, urging a kind of 
worldview-shaping perspective that can function in powerful and sometimes       
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disturbing ways.  This comparison offers surprising new insights about how humans 
act in circumscribed spaces—whether they are explicitly religious or not—and how 
they use these circumscribed spaces to map order onto reality itself. 
The method here is cumulative.  By introducing key concepts that build upon one 
another, I move from the theoretical into the practical, weaving together key notions 
from theory about ritual, about sacred space, and about gaming.  Ultimately, I show 
how violent war-based video games, when they work like rituals and like sacred 
spaces, have the potential to map onto real life as dangerous models for how to inter-
act with others.  Indeed, if video games can work as sacred spaces, then we should 
be particularly critical of those games that use this power to foment divisive us-
versus-them modalities.  After introducing the key theoretical concepts that will help 
to make sense of the phenomenon, I present several troubling case studies of what 
can happen when violent gaming worlds map onto reality.  I end with a case study 
about an Iranian Muslim game designer who fell victim to the simplified ritualized 
dualisms inherent in the American video games he himself designed and who was 
subsequently sentenced to death. 
Sacred Space  
 
Sacred space is “significant space, a site, orientation, or set of relations subject to 
interpretation because it focuses crucial questions about what it means to be a human 
being in a meaningful world” (Chidester and Linenthal 12).  Human beings build 
sacred places and engage in sacred ritual as a way of projecting or enacting their 
own desire for meaning, their own hope that there is indeed a “Sacred” or a “Real” 
beyond worldly, profane existence.  Similarly, people construct video games as a 
kind of sacred space into which they inject their wishes for how the world might 
work.  Video game construction, like ritual performance, is a means of demonstrat-
ing desire, of mapping order, of developing rules for how to live.  People who build 
sacred spaces are often making the claim, through their actions, that there is a sacred 
model, a Real, that should be copied in this world.  Video games can, at times, ex-
hibit similar features of order-making. 
Contemporary theorists of sacred space argue that such spaces need not exhibit a 
“timeless” quality of the sort proposed by Eliade, but can be identified more readily 
by their functional qualities, their ability to circumscribe space in deeply meaningful 
and often ideologically determined, ways.  Roger Friedland and Richard D. Hecht 
point out the limitations of the work of classic theorists like Eliade, Gerardus van der 
Leeuw, and Joachim Wach who identify sacred spaces as “sacred for all time”   
without enough attention paid to “how space is socially constructed, organized, and 
reproduced over time.”  With such an approach, they explain, sacred space is 
“stripped of politics and real history” (25).  Instead, they propose, sacred space is 
“more a matter of interpretation, of setting boundaries, and of relationships than 
fixed categories which have universal consent and agreement among and between 
believers” (27).  Chidester and Linenthal agree, arguing that sacred space is ritual 
space, a “location for formulized repeatable symbolic performances”—a description 
that sounds a lot like the arena of a video game, in which experiences are typically 
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highly scripted and shaped, repeatable until the player gets it “right” in terms of the 
game’s predetermined design for performance (9). 
Drawing on the work of Dutch cultural theorist Johan Huizinga, an argument can 
be made that ritual, sacred space, and play have a lot in common in that all of these 
create a distinct space separate from everyday life for special activities.  As Huizinga 
explains, “we find play present everywhere as a well-defined quality of action which 
is different from ‘ordinary’ life” (4).  Play, he says, is a “stepping out of ‘real’ life 
into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own” (8).  Play      
provides a space and time in which new rules adhere, in which one can perform “an 
act apart.”  Play, says Huizinga, “creates order, is order” such that “into an imperfect 
world and into the confusion of life it brings a temporary, limited perfection” via the 
establishment of fixed rules and outcomes (10).  Ritual enacts a similar mode of 
cosmos crafting.  Ritual performers “are convinced that the action actualizes and 
effects a definite beatification, brings about an order of things higher than that in 
which they customarily live” (14).  In this sense, we need not determine whether or 
not Eliade or Huizinga are right to posit a Platonic “Real” or “Sacred” to which all 
“sacred space” gestures.  Rather, it is enough to observe the human wish that sacred 
spaces should point beyond themselves to something more “real” and to observe the 
ritualized activities they perform to convince themselves that they do. 
Friedland and Hecht are critical of what they see as Eliade’s oversimplification   
of the contested nature of sacred locations, but they do agree with him that sacred 
space is a potent site for human meaning-making. Emphasizing the political and 
interpretive elements of sacred space construction and use, they argue that sacred 
space must be viewed as “a structure of limitation and closure, like the canon or the 
process of divination with a fixed and limited number of objects to be interpreted 
and understood.”  Sacred space is more a conversation than a thing; it is “a matter of 
context and relation with specific grammars which make them meaningful,” shaped 
by “grammars which regulate” our understanding of the space itself (27).  This   
notion of space as a negotiated site of meaning marks the ability of sacred space to 
function in ways that emphasize the give and take of meaning as interplay with rules.  
That is to say, sacred space can function as a form of play, a notion that itself is   
integrally related to ritual.  Put in Huizinga’s terms, sacred space, like ritual and play, 
is a kind of “magic circle.”  Indeed, the “magic circle” turns out to be a key principle 
in the comparison between the paired theoretical components of ritual/sacred space 
and program/virtual space. 
The Magic Circle  
 
For Huizinga, play “proceeds within its own boundaries of time and space accord-
ing to fixed rules and in an orderly manner.  It promotes the formation of social 
groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their      
difference from the common world by disguise or other means” (13).  Huizinga  
recognizes the similarities between games and rituals when he observes that in a 
sacred ritual performance, the participants are also engaged in a kind of sacred play 
that “brings about an order of things higher than that in which [participants] custom-
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arily live.”  The ritual performance, however, “still retains the formal characteristics 
of play in every respect.”  It is performed “within a playground that is literally 
‘staked out’” since a sacred space functions as a “temporarily real world of its own.”  
Both sacred play (as ritual) and ordinary play (as game), then, involve entry into a 
“temporarily real world” in a space “expressly hedged off for it” (14).  Both involve 
the sense of entering into a controlled space, where play is shaped by possibilities 
determined by rules, comforting in its ordered nature.  Sacred space, then, is a site at 
which play happens. 
Of course, games have long had the ability to simplify real life events by placing 
them into idealized gaming spaces.  Elliot Avedon and Brian Sutton-Smith surmise 
that board games have their origins in military planning, since “board-games, from 
the rudest up to chess, are so generally of the nature of kriegspiel, or war-game, the 
men marching on the field to unite their forces or capture their enemies, that this 
notion of mimic war may have been the very key to their invention” (73).  Whether 
the desire to take over space via warfare was the original intention of board games  
or not, games are also very closely affiliated in history with religion and with the 
sanctification of territory.  In the Hopi tribes of Arizona, for example, Stewart Culin 
identifies a ball game that is also a race, an event that itself symbolically functions as 
“a magical rite to secure fields within its circuit against sandstorms” (62).  Clearly, 
the ritualized circumscribing of space has a long and often religiously-motivated 
history. 
Game theorist Alexander Galloway sees contemporary digital play as similarly 
characterized by a walling off from ordinary life to create temporary ritualized   
spaces of experience.  Galloway calls gaming “a ritualistic dromenon of players 
transported to the imaginary place of game-play, and acted out in the form of       
diegetic operator act” (37).2  Religion and game play both offer to ritually transport 
practitioners into an ideal space that offers a sense of purpose and meaning defined 
by pre-set rules.  In ritual, play is seen in the interstices between prescribed activities, 
wherein the performer’s choices emerge.  Similarly, in games, play creates what 
Salen and Zimmerman call a “space of possibility” afforded a player to explore the 
world of the game and to make choices within it: 
The space of possibility of a game is a plane stretched between 
two anchorage points:  the beginning and the end of the game. 
The players journey from one end to another, making their way 
from start to finish. In a well-designed game that supports mean-
ingful play, this journey between points should be taut and effi-
cient, with every element contributing directly or indirectly to the 
larger experience. (258) 
One can easily see how ritual, especially religious ritual, does similar kinds of work, 
creating a string of predetermined actions within predetermined space, creating 
meaning through the tension between what one can do and what one ought not      
do.  Ritual theorist Roy Rappaport describes rituals as having “liturgical orders”      
or “invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances repeated in specified           
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contexts” (429).  Stanley Tambiah also points to the formal structure of many ritual 
experiences, describing ritual as “constituted of patterned and ordered sequences of 
words and acts, often expressed in multiple media, whose content and arrangement 
are characterized in varying degree by formality (conventionality), stereotypy  (rigid-
ity), condensation (fusion), and redundancy (repetition)” (497).  Frits Staal claims 
that in ritual activity, “the rules count, but not the result” whereas “in ordinary     
activity it is the other way around…  What is essential in the [ritual] ceremony is the 
precise and faultless execution, in accordance with rules, of numerous rites and   
recitations” (487).  Despite the amount of “play” that might be evoked, rituals often 
include rather rigid rules, and like games develop meaning for the performer through 
engagement with those rules. 
Games, then, can work in ways that remarkably resemble rituals—down to the 
emphasis on a kind of rigid repetition requiring “faultless execution” of predeter-
mined gestures and behaviors.  Games also closely link ritual experience and cir-
cumscribed space.  Game theorists Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman describe games 
as taking place in a carefully demarcated other space, arguing that “the frame of a 
game is what communicates that those contained within it are ‘playing’ and that the 
space of play is separate in some way from that of the real world” (94).  However, 
just as ritual theorists argue about the fluid give-and-take between the ritualized and 
the real, Salen and Zimmerman similarly urge that we should not assume that     
gaming spaces have no bearing on ordinary life.  Far from being insulated from the 
real world, when we interact with games “as culture,” we find that “the magic circle 
is not an impermeable curtain but is instead a border that can be crossed.”  That is to 
say, games are “not isolated from their environment, but are intrinsically part of it, 
participating in the ebb and flow of ideas and values that make up a larger cultural 
setting.”  The effects may be explicit or implicit, but games exist in real life contexts, 
and are played by real people, who are shaped by the experiences.  When engaged 
with the magic circle of game play “cultural meanings ripple outward from the game 
to interact with numerous cultural contexts” (572).  Something real happens when 
we play games and when we engage in rituals. 
Both games and religion, then, create circumscribed other-spaces in which mean-
ingful choices are made, indeed, in which meaning is made through choices.  Ritual 
and space are linked in both.  The magic circle, the religious ritual, and the sacred 
space are all kin concepts, equally concerned with a space set apart from ordinary 
life in which fixed rules adhere, promising predictability and creating meaning.   
Play thus depends upon the notion of fixedness, and exists in the agitation of inter-
pretation, transformation, re-creation that is possible because a more solid standard 
prevails in the form of rules, a fixed story, or a preconceived environment.  Gamer 
theory and ritual theory meet at precisely this point, evoking comparisons between 
the demarcated space of play and the arena of ritual performance, inviting difficult 
questions about the relationship between real space and imagined space, between 
religion and games, belief and action.  The notion of belief then becomes a crucial 
element in examining the perspective of players as they navigate in and out of     
imagined other worlds and spaces. 
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Making Belief  
 
If a “magic circle” is a map, a set of rules, and a template for an imagined world, 
then a ritual space is also a kind of magic circle that is intended to reflect its radiance 
onto the real world writ large.  Belief is the means by which this mapping is made 
effective.  The “magic circle” of the sacrament of communion, for example,             
is intended to generate its efficacy from the altar outward as a result of belief,      
encompassing the space of the whole world, where the “rules” of that transaction are 
then presumed to still hold.  Belief is deeply implicated in adhering to the set of rules 
that define a magic circle in both rituals and in games.  Rituals say to their perform-
ers:  This is not a game.  It’s the real thing:  what happens in this ritual space is real, 
authentic, and says something meaningful about how the world—the cosmos—
operates.  Games, on the other hand, seem to require belief of a different sort—a 
temporary adherence to the magic circle’s rules and a mere performance of         
conviction.  However, as I argue below, sometimes games can work as rituals, with 
as many meaning-making presumptions about mapping onto real life as a religious 
ritual.  Indeed, we could argue that belief happens in the very assumption that what 
happens in a circumscribed space can and should spill over into everyday life. 
The idea of belief as something that is “performed” is articulated persuasively by 
performance theorist Richard Schechner.  In his discussion about the ritualized   
performance of belief, he proposes that we should distinguish between “making  
believe” and “making belief.”  For Schechner, “make believe” is an imaginative act 
that retains the boundaries between real and play, and is denoted by merely         
“pretending to believe.”  This category, then, would encompass the attitude         
embraced by most players of games, including videogames.  We “make believe” 
when we choose to enter into temporary gaming spaces to abide by the rules       
circumscribed therein. Indeed, with “make believe,” the rules of such spaces are to 
be abided by only within the game’s space and time. A game, in this case, is “just”    
a game. 
By contrast, “make belief” involves an intentional blurring of these boundaries   
in that performers are “enacting the effects they want the receivers of their           
performances to accept ‘for real’” (Performance Studies 35).  “Make belief,” then, 
sounds more like the way religion tends to work.  Religious belief is performative; it 
enacts that which it presumes to depict, often through prescribed rituals.  Schechner 
elsewhere looks at the role of art in religion and “other belief systems” to propose 
that in “make belief” people construct belief when they “make what isn’t            
there, combine elements from fantasy, actualize situations that occur only as art       
or performance.  These actualizations in the service of social organization, thought, 
ritual, or rebellious anti-structure contain, transmit, and (dare I say it?) create the 
very circumstances they purport to depict” (Performance Theory 220-21).  Put  
bluntly, the difference here is between belief as religious conviction and suspension 
of disbelief as the commitment to gaming worlds.  Bernard Suits calls suspension of 
disbelief in gaming situations the “lusory attitude,” and says that it explains the   
“curious state of affairs wherein one adopts rules which require one to employ worse 
rather than better means for reaching an end” (38).  When one plays a game, one 
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suspends disbelief by committing to the rules of the game, by entering its world and 
ascribing to its rules.  If this is a form of belief, it is presumed to be temporary and 
contingent. 
Belief and suspension of disbelief, however, both involve choice, and both     
manifest in forms of play and ritual. Both too often are expressed in relationship to 
circumscribed spaces. But “make belief” seems to demand more of us than suspen-
sion of disbelief; it requires that we see the whole world as a game, as the space of 
play.  Furthermore, “make belief” seems to require assent to one set of rules only, 
and this in turn may require us to identify winners and losers, to expect everyone to 
play by the same rules.  Religious belief, as a kind of “make belief,” requires that its 
magic circle spill over to encompass all of life.  Here is where the game of religion 
can become ugly—when the purpose of play is to convince everyone else that your 
game is the only one worth playing, and those who won’t adhere to your rules are 
rejected.  But under certain circumstances gamers too can commit so deeply to the 
worlds they enter into that the rules of the game bleed over into real life, urging 
some to see the world in simplistic us-versus-them modalities.3  Gamers too can 
practice “make belief.” 
The problem, then, is that the categories of “make believe” and “make belief”   
too easily collapse into one another. It’s impossible to externally determine the    
authenticity of any personal belief that involves imagined space and ritualized     
performance, whether it is explicitly religious or not.  The rules of belief can shape 
gaming environments as readily as religious ones can shape social environments in 
real life.  And the suspension of disbelief is differentiated from “make belief”      
only by the presumption of imagination by those who “make believe” and the pre-
sumption of authenticity on the part of those who “make belief.”  The transition from 
“make believe” to “make belief” can be seen in a popular new form of gameplay, the 
ARG (alternate reality game).  Also known as “pervasive play,” this new mode of 
“make belief” invites the imprint of preconceived gaming rules onto reality, working 
much like a religion in its re-enchanting of everyday life with the seductive promise 
of discoverable purpose. 
This Is Not a Game  
 
One of the means by which we can observe the overlap between belief in games 
and belief in ritual is by looking at some of the emerging new modes of game play.  
Jane McGonigal defines “pervasive play” as forms of “mixed reality” games that use 
mobile or embedded digital technology to “create virtual playing fields in everyday 
spaces” (1).  She identifies “immersive games” as those that additionally employ a 
“this is not a game” (TINAG) rhetoric.  Such games “do everything in their power to 
erase game boundaries—physical, temporal and social—and to obscure the meta-
communications that might otherwise announce, ‘This is play’” (2).  In other words, 
such games intentionally spill over from the circumscribed space of the game and 
into real life, mapping order onto it, lighting the world up with a sense of possibility 
that works much like religious awe.  This spillover can happen through clues for the 
game that are shared by real life actors, phone calls made to player’s cell phones, and 
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through live group play that intersects with online goals.  Belief is reinforced via the 
game’s rules, marking it as functionally no different from a ritual in terms of shaped 
behaviors intersecting with the performance of belief.  Indeed, pervasive play invites 
the same kind of enchantment of the world that would invite someone of faith to see 
miracles at work in the world, since in an immersive form of pervasive play, any-
thing in one’s environment might be part of the game, intended to relay a message or 
clue to the player. 
“Belief” is exhibited in buying into the game, which involves committing to    
seeing the real world as necessarily filled with purpose and shaped by the rules of 
game play.  Game becomes ritual, shedding the radiance of the magic circle onto the 
space of ordinary life, which itself is embraced within that circle of play.  Sacred 
space becomes indistinguishable from life itself, which is made magical, charged 
with imagination by the ever-present possibility of meaning.  Anything, anywhere 
might be part of the game, arranged just so by the game designers for our keen-eyed 
discovery.  It’s hard not to see in this kind of gaming the same impulse to belief that 
inspires hardcore religious folk to spot Jesus in a patch of ivy or the name of Allah in 
a fried egg.  Religion, perhaps, can be viewed as the world’s longest running form of 
pervasive play. 
As if anticipating the dangerous implications of locating authentic belief in an  
environment of play, McGonigal proposes that “instead of focusing on the risks of 
real belief” in pervasive play we should ask questions like:  “What are the specific 
pleasures and payoffs for gamers of feigned belief in a play setting?” and “How do 
these practices of performed belief influence players in their everyday, non-game 
lives?”  Using qualifying terms like “feigned” and “performed,” McGonigal is    
arguing that the magic circle remains intact as exhibited in the willful performance 
of belief on the part of the player.  But at the same time she is arguing that the magic 
circle is permeable in its ability to shape other aspects of life beyond game play.  Can 
players really simply choose how much of the game’s argument spills over into real 
life just by remaining aware that they are playing a game?  McGonigal thinks so.  
Players, she proposes, willfully choose to see the world as infused by the game’s 
rules, and can tell when play should be put aside for other things.  Games aren’t real, 
she argues, but they can have real effects, making us stronger, braver, or more 
skilled.  Belief is bracketed, qualified, circumscribed, denied.  And yet, the activity 
of spillover from the circumscribed space of game play onto real life is observable, 
and belief seems a required component. 
Furthermore, McGonigal doesn’t offer us any means for clearly differentiating  
between the “performance of belief” and belief itself, apart from gesturing toward 
the player’s innate sense that he or she knows that belief is merely performed.       
But belief always seems to be a performance in whatever context it appears,       
manifesting as the willingness to abide within a given worldview, even if            
temporarily, and to follow the rules of that world.  Furthermore, the performance of 
belief cannot be distinguished from belief itself by just saying the former is confined 
to a magic circle of play and the latter is linked to religious practice and ritual, since 
games do in fact always spill over into real life in some form or another, even if they 
are not forms of pervasive play.  In distinction from McGonigal, I argue that the 
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magic circle (the “sacred space” of a game) is permeable just like any other mode   
of cultural practice.  Belief is to be defined as performed investment in the rules    
and values of a given “magic circle,” and it is visible in the ways that people       
allow the “magic circle” to spill over into everyday life. In every case, the give and 
take between space of play and real life is fluid, with games shaping real life       
experience.  “Make believe” easily slips into “make belief” when we aren’t paying 
attention. 
Games and Frames  
 
The ritual and sacred qualities of circumscribed spaces also find an analog in  
how game theorists talk about games and frames.  Indeed, this analogy gestures 
against the insularity of gaming that McGonigal insists upon by showing that          
all games, like all rituals, are human constructs that are interactive with the larger 
culture in which they reside.  Gamer theorists Salen and Zimmerman acknowledge 
that games are not always impervious “magic circles,” and use the language of 
“frames” to talk about how games intersect with real life, proposing that “the wider 
our cultural frame grows in defining games as culture, the more their artificiality 
begins to unravel” (572).  Because games are played by players—that is, by        
living human beings, games cannot be seamless spaces completely separate        
from real life.  They are part of culture and can, at times, profoundly shape it.    
Gamer theorists Jon Dovey and Helen Kennedy agree, proposing that for games,   
the “magic circle” defines a separate space for play, but “it is not a utopian space,     
a nowhere—it still exists in the context of social time and material space” (29).   
Like sacred spaces, games exist in real and sometimes ideologically charged       
environments. 
Rituals, too, are deeply interactive, as contemporary ritual theorists understand.  
Accordingly, the term “ritual” is increasingly being replaced by the term             
“performance” or “ritualization” as a means of emphasizing the interactivity, the 
procedurality, involved in a ritual.  As Rappaport notes, “performance as well as 
formality is necessary for ritual” (428).  Even those theorists like Staal who deny   
the communicative function of ritual altogether do generally concede that ritual is 
something that people do:  “Ritual is primarily activity” and “the important thing is 
what you do, not what you think, believe, or say” (485).  Seen in this way, ritual       
is intensely “interactive,” characterized by what Catherine Bell describes as “inter-
action of the body with a structured environment.”  Focusing on the individual’s 
negotiation with a ritual structure, Bell suggests that “ritual mastery” is “a corrective 
to the habit of thinking about ritual as an existing entity of some sort” (107).  Ritual 
is a process, she argues, tied up deeply with other social processes that are encoun-
tered, assessed, and either appropriated or rejected by individuals.  What is most 
important about ritual, she says, “is not what it says or symbolizes, but that first and 
foremost it does things” (111).  Ritual is always a performance, always engaged in 
by real people in real lived environments. Both games and rituals, then, can be    
understood to be circumscribed, scripted experiences that are shaped by, and spill 
back over, into their spatial and social contexts. 
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Such an argument reveals the red herring in contemporary debates about whether 
or not video games “cause” violent behavior.  Video games do not directly cause 
violent behavior, nor are they utterly benign.  Instead, if we view video games as 
having the ability to work like rituals, as entities functioning like sacred spaces, then 
it becomes obvious that they have the power to profoundly shape our attitudes,  
without directly causing or predetermining any particular behavior.  Like all       
symbolic systems, video games present us with a visual and performative            
language, and through their procedural rhetoric, they encourage certain views    
about the world.  Games don’t force us to do anything, but they do shape our values, 
just like rituals do. 
As ideologically-charged circumscribed symbolic spaces, video games, especially 
violent war games, can be compared to the “sacred spaces” of battleground         
memorials.  Edward Linenthal argues that battle reenactment is “another form         
of veneration” in the sense of civil or patriotic religion, in that reenactors “seek   
imaginative entry into the heroic past, re-creating the total environment of the time 
of battle and thus paying meticulous attention to the authenticity of the clothes they 
wear and the food they eat.”  Such reenactments circumscribe history, telling us how 
to make sense of events of war, and even presenting the “dangerous illusion” that 
war is “glamorous” (5).  War-infused video games like the Call of Duty franchise, 
Gears of War series, and the Medal of Honor series of games similarly promote the 
glory of war by defining it in terms of strict notions of victory and defeat, us-versus-
them—whether they are set in recognizable earthly locations or in imagined earth-
like planets.  The website for Medal of Honor describes the mapping abilities of the 
game’s design.  Medal of Honor: Warfighter “gives players the ability to be in real 
world events” and “lets you experience the action as it might have taken place in the 
field.”  With a game story that was “written by actual Tier 1 Operators,” the game 
invites players to “step into the boots of these warfighters and apply unique skill sets 
to track down a real global threat, in real international locations, sponsored by real 
enemies.”  The digital space of the game is meant to be read as mapping onto the 
real life space depicted in it, since “It doesn’t get any more authentic than Medal of 
Honor: Warfighter.” 
Jesper Juul says that most games depend upon such mapping techniques,           
requiring at least one instance in which “the player performs some act, such as   
moving a piece on a board or pressing a key on a keyboard, that is projected as   
having a specific meaning in the game world.  The moment of mapping is one that 
has a basic sense of happening now, when you play” (134).  A real-life physical ac-
tion such as pressing a key or using a joystick “immediately affects the world inside 
the game,” such that the game can actually be seen as a “parallel world, happening  
in real time” (133).  In 2007, this kind of performative mapping had serious effects 
when the Anglican Church objected to a violent shootout that takes place in a virtual 
replica of Manchester Cathedral, within the video game Resistance: Fall of Man.  
Even though the shootout involved the destruction of aliens in an imagined alternate 
history, the Church still argued that the use of a well-known sacred space within the 
violent context of the game rendered it symbolically damaging.  The mashing of 
buttons, in this case, was seen as constituting a form of “virtual desecration” since it 
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resulted in visual destruction of the Cathedral’s environs.4  In the case of war-based 
video games depicting real-life events, this performative mapping typically serves as 
a simplification of real events according to the internal logic of the game itself.  A 
virtual form of the sacralization of battle, these video games perform functions    
similar to battle re-enactments by distilling the notion of war into a simple urge for 
victory.  In such cases, storytelling is ideological and performative.  When video 
games involve the violent destruction of real life sacred space, as in the case of   
Resistance: Fall of Man, the symbolic stakes are even higher. 
The question we should be asking then is not whether video games can shape us 
as ideological “spaces” with performative power—but rather how we are shaped by 
them.  We should, of course, be hesitant to propose that all games have deep cultural 
power.  For some, the magic circle remains mostly intact, affecting us lightly or in 
harmless ways.  This is especially true for extremely abstract games like tic-tac-toe 
or chess, and true for many of the most creative modes of otherworldly fantasy game 
play.  However, all games have some effect on our lives, and even for those video-
games that seem to have no intrinsic affiliation with day-to-day reality, the spillover 
can be profound:  product display, comic conventions, LARPing (live action role 
play), and even just local fandom can introduce elements of game play into the space 
of real life in complex negotiation.  The magic circle is permeable, even if the spill-
over takes many different forms.  This is as obvious as the costumes that players 
wear at conventions and the swag that devoted fans will buy about their favorite 
movie or videogame.  We already knew that religious rituals can shape worldviews, 
but it is now obvious that games have this quality too.  Both games and religious 
rituals are interactive forms of play, agitating against a firmer ground of perspectives 
embedded into the magic circle of the given activity.  We move now to a focus on 
the kinds of activities encouraged in violent video games, and to another key       
concept, procedural rhetoric. 
Procedural Rhetoric  
 
Game theorist Ian Bogost coined the term procedural rhetoric to refer to “the 
practice of persuading through processes in general and computational processes     
in particular.”  Procedural rhetoric can help us understand both production and    
reception of videogames, since procedural rhetoric is “a technique for making     
arguments with computational systems and for unpacking computational arguments 
others have created” (3).  Procedural rhetoric invites inquiry into “the way things 
work:  the methods, techniques, and logics that drive the operation of systems” (9).  
Computerized processes argue things by asking us to do things, even if only symbol-
ically.  Machines respond to us, creating what Galloway calls “grammars of action” 
that, like rituals, limit our choices in predetermined ways (4).  As Galloway explains, 
“Acts of configuration are a rendering of life” (16).  Put in familiar terms, virtual 
spaces always function as “magic circles,” microcosms of meaning that project their 
worldview onto real life, whether or not we consciously recognize these processes at 
work.  The programming of virtual spaces by design implies purpose on the part of 
the designer, and the limitation and shaping of experience. 
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Lawrence Lessig warns that with any digital medium, “code embeds values.  It 
enables, or not, certain control . . . to the end of whatever sovereign does the coding” 
(114).  Indeed, choices are so transcribed that we might, with Torben Grodal,       
describe most video games simply as “collections of linear stories” in which the 
options are “only virtual” (146).  Each game world is based on a map or “system of 
multiple linear routes” through virtual space and virtual interactions or choices (147).  
As Arthur Asa Berger notes, “the player’s feeling that he or she is in control is only 
an illusion.  Every choice, and its attendant consequences, has already been placed in 
the story by the programmers, writers, and artists who created the game” (191).  
Both games and rituals create imagined spaces in which rules adhere that affect     
our lives, even when the game or ritual has ended. Sometimes these worldviews    
are banal and innocent, but other times they can shape our perspectives in           
damaging ways. 
Procedural rhetoric, of course, applies to more than just computation.  Many    
cultural systems, religion and its rituals included, exhibit persuasive processes.  
Gerardus Van der Leeuw’s classic analysis of religion, Religion in Essence and  
Manifestation, explores the positioning of sacred space as what Chidester and 
Linenthal deem a “political act,” with intentional “positioning” that typically       
involves “selection, orientation, limitation, or conquest” such that “every establish-
ment of sacred space [is] a conquest of space” (7-8).  Possession or control of sacred 
spaces can be seen as a kind of “procedural rhetoric” engineered by believers to 
make a particular ideological point about the world, and sometimes even the cosmos 
at large.  As in video games that require symbolic elimination of enemies, the     
“politics of exclusion might be an integral part of the making of sacred space” (8).  
Sacred spaces evoke and are shaped by preconceived procedural rhetorics, manifest 
in transactions of use, abuse, transformation, negotiation, and presentation, and in 
arguments about who belongs and who does not.  We turn now to look at some   
examples of games that integrate many of the key principles we have considered so 
far.  In these games, we can see explicit procedural rhetorics functioning like rituals 
of exclusion, integrating the performance of belief through mapping circumscribed 
gaming environments onto real life situations. 
Mapping Real-Life Spaces  
 
Games, as we have already seen, always exist in context; the space of the game is 
always related to the space of real life.  Our job is to think about how this is the case, 
and to be critical of those games that too readily simplify a complex globalizing  
culture, and that accordingly encourage players to embrace a naïve procedural    
rhetoric about real life.  As Friedland and Hecht point out, violence “is a form of 
communication,” and symbolic violence, especially in sacred spaces, “is an adjunct 
to material violence,” used by one group of people to “mobilize their communities” 
against another one, and to “make their definition of reality the dominant one, to 
demonstrate the ultimate powerlessness of the other, and to redefine the other as 
radically alien, as profane.”  Sacred space is an especially potent site for symbolic 
violence, since “[b]y profaning the other’s sacred place you make the other profane, 
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an alien with no claim to possession of that space” (56).  So it may matter little if the 
symbolic violence happens on real ground or in virtual space; the damage done may 
be equally palpable.  Several recent video games reveal how game space can      
function as set apart or “sacred” space by presenting an idealized view of the world 
marking out who doesn’t “belong” and mapping a gaming reality onto real life via 
an ideological discourse of divisive play. 
In August of 2007, actor Stephen Baldwin, along with his Christian evangelical 
entertainment troupe Operation Straight Up (OSU), sponsored a movement to     
deliver copies of Left Behind: Eternal Forces inside care packages for U.S. troops in 
Iraq, a move presumably approved by the U. S. Department of Defense.  OSU    
president Jonathan Sprinks said of their activities in Iraq:  “We feel the forces of 
heaven have encouraged us to perform multiple crusades that will sweep through 
this war-torn region” (Schechter).  Such a claim is especially troubling due to    
complaints by Muslim and Jewish groups that the game depicts these religious 
groups negatively, with some characters portrayed as ultimately unredeemable and 
therefore simply as enemies to be destroyed in its apocalyptic scenario.  The space of 
the game exhibits a damaging procedural rhetoric that is meant to translate onto real 
life in the form of prescribed negative attitudes about those who believe differently.  
When the plan to distribute the game to soldiers was exposed, the resulting public 
outcry caused the Department of Defense to withdraw support for delivery of the 
game, but other games with less obvious religious affiliations are still played by  
soldiers, with potentially damaging procedural arguments for how to deal with    
difference. 
It is not just evangelical Christians who create games with the intent to map a 
game’s procedural rhetoric onto the space of real life.  Vit Sisler describes the      
immensely rising popularity of cyber cafes in the wealthy Gulf states of the Middle 
East.  The cafes are “equipped with networked computers and occupied till late at 
night by a predominantly young, male audience-playing games, commenting on  
how others play, and socializing around these activities.”  The playing of these 
games, says Sisler, is not passive but “rather it is a dynamic interaction between  
production and fulfillment of expectations, meanings, and messages.”  In 2003, the 
Hezbollah Central Internet Bureau released Special Force, a game designed to    
represent the Hezbollah missions during the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon    
in the early 1980s.  As author Helga Tawil Souri argues, “the driving force behind  
children going in droves to computer centers was not to escape the violence            
on the streets but to participate in the violence on digital screen” (36).  In the     
game, players act as Lebanese fighters from the real-life mission, and practice     
their “shooting skills” while aiming at Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon              
and other Israeli leaders (35).  Souri observes that “[a]lthough [such] games are       
based on actual history, their lure for Arab gamers has been the ability to               
turn the tables on Israeli power over Palestinians and have the upper hand in          
the resistance without any real-life repercussions” (538).  The popularity of            
the games, then, has something to do with the real-life wish to map the            
games’ violent procedural rhetoric onto real life situations, to “win” and to oust     
the “losers.” 
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Media theorist Mark J. P. Wolf explains that in violent shooting games, “if the 
player-character does not attack or kill the other characters, he is killed and the game 
ends badly.”  The game’s procedures and rules work to “guide a player into a      
particular way of thinking” in real life (109).  The “this is not a game” principle is 
particularly powerful here; games are no longer “just” games but have become  
powerful rituals of imagined performance.  They have become sacred, “set apart” 
spaces, symbolic arenas of religious polarization informed by a mutually reinforcing 
assumption of providential design within the game and in real life.  As Bell puts it, 
“ritualization is the way to construct power relations when the power is claimed to 
be from God, not from military might or economic superiority; it is also the way for 
people to experience a vision of a community order that is personally empowering” 
(116).  Games functioning as rituals make us feel stronger and more powerful, even 
when real life suggests otherwise. 
Some U.S. military officials seem to have agreed with the potency of video games 
as ritualized shapers of behavior and perspective.  Lieutenant Colonel Scott Sutton, 
director of the technology division at Quantico Marine Base, told The Washington 
Post that many young recruits are video game players and thus “probably feel       
less inhibited, down in their primal level, pointing their weapons at somebody.”  A 
combat engineer also interviewed by the Post compared shooting at insurgents in 
Iraq to playing Halo, a very popular futuristic fighting game:  “It felt like I was in a 
big video game.  It didn't even faze me, shooting back. It was just natural instinct.  
Boom!  Boom!  Boom!  Boom!”  Even though Halo depicts a fantastic, otherworldly 
space in which fighting against aliens occurs, soldiers can easily recognize the    
dualistic procedural rhetoric of the game, and can translate it directly to the battle-
field, letting Iraqis take the place of the aliens:  “The insurgents were firing from the 
other side of the bridge… We called in a helicopter for an airstrike… I couldn't   
believe I was seeing this.  It was like Halo.  It didn't even seem real, but it was real.”  
Another soldier expressed trepidation the first time he fired his gun, an M249 squad 
automatic weapon but acquired confidence upon remembering what it felt like to 
play violent video games:  “I was scared.  I had never shot my gun before at an   
actual person.  But once I pulled the trigger, that was it, I never hesitated…  All I 
saw was the street where the RPG [rocket-propelled grenade] came from, and I just 
fired in that direction, maybe 20 rounds at most, and it felt like I was playing Ghost 
Recon at home” (Vargas).  These are effective rituals, indeed. 
Such simplistic modes of us-versus-them are particularly common in war-based 
video games, where a game’s procedural rhetoric can be viewed as identical to the 
procedural rhetoric mapped onto real-life spaces of war.  There is no need, in such 
worldviews, to encounter an enemy as a person—he or she is simply an obstacle to 
be overcome.  One soldier interviewed by Jose Vargas claimed that he fully under-
stood that video games are different from real war, but explained how games can  
prepare you for battle anyway:  “Of course, [war is] not a game.  The feel of the  
actual weapon was more of an adrenaline rush than the feel of the controller…  But 
you’re practically doing the same thing: trying to kill the other person.  The goal is 
the same.  That's the similarity.  The goal is to survive.”  As Friedland and Hecht 
observe of sacred space, symbolic violence is “a way to mobilize intense opposition, 
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to polarize the situation using a very few resources” (56).  Because virtual sacred 
space has the same symbolic power for some as real life sacred space, the effect of 
symbolic violence can be just as powerful in fomenting enmity. 
Stereotyped digital representations only increase the binary effect.  Sisler critiques 
a number of games in which Muslims are depicted with a distorted lens, arguing that 
such games “exhibit very similar stereotyping and schematizations to those that     
are already known from other media.”  Citing Prince of Persia, The Magic of    
Scheherazade, and Arabian Nights, Sisler argues that “these games typically feature 
characters like Bedouins, caliphs, djinns and belly dancers; navigate players through 
bazaars, harems and the desert; and the story often contains plots like saving kid-
napped woman or assassinating an evil vizier.”  Such games, says Sisler “flatten out 
the diverse ethnic and religious identities of the Islamic world and reconstruct them 
into a few schematized characters” (qtd. in Haenni).  By repeating the same        
troubling procedural rhetoric of encounter, these games work like powerful rituals  
of exclusion. 
Such games can also work as a sinister kind of “sacred space.”  As Chidester and 
Linenthal note, sacred space is far from neutral, but is rather “a means for grounding 
classifications and orientations in reality, giving particular force to the meaningful 
focus gained through these aspects of a worldview.”  Functioning as “significant 
space,” sacred locations “focus a classification of persons, carving out a place for a 
human identity that can be distinguished from superhuman persons, perhaps to be 
worshiped, and those classified as subhuman who can be excluded, manipulated, 
dominated, degraded, or sacrificed” (12).  Stereotypes abound on both sides in these 
games; American games present skewed portraits of Muslims and Arabs, and games 
produced in Muslim and Arab countries present distorted views of Americans.5  By 
mapping the game’s space on top of real life space and integrating a divisive       
procedural rhetoric, such games suggest we should see real life spaces as following 
the same set of damning rules. 
Digital Dualism  
 
As “highly charged sites,” sacred spaces invite “contested negotiations over      
the ownership of symbolic capital (or symbolic real estate) that signifies power   
relations” (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 16).  Sacred places, say Chidester          
and Linenthal, “are arenas in which power relations…between insiders and         
outsiders, rulers and subjects, elders and juniors, males and females, and so on, can 
be adjudicated” (16).  Violent war-based video games come to function together in 
this way, as a kind of repetitive sinister ritual of digital dualism in crafted “sacred 
space.”  The simplified spaces of these games offer a means of dealing with           
the complexity of difference through hatred and killing, a reliable but heartless    
algorithm. 
Through the sacralization of a fixed procedural rhetoric (a ritual experience)  
within an idealized space of play, such games habituate us to the idea of war.  This is 
not to say that we should engage in the kind of over-generalized and naïve claims of 
people like Jack Thompson and David Grossman who argue that violent video 
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games directly teach players to kill.6  Rather, violent war-themed video games       
are part of what Nick Dyer-Witheford and Grieg de Peuter dub “an ensemble of 
practices aimed at disinhibiting, disciplining, and directing deadly aggression,     
ferociously etching direct lines from simulation to actuality.”  They function as   
rituals of desensitization and inoculations against complexity.  Cultural “militariza-
tion” of life makes war seem normal, resulting in narrow-minded perspectives about 
how to deal with political and religious difference such that:  “Hatred toward an  
officially designated enemy, triumph in his death, or at least indifference toward its 
necessity, vigilance against his wiles, acceptance of casualties in the course of   
struggle, uncritical loyalty for ‘our side,’ and so on, all become values promulgated 
across a wide social bandwidth” (117). 
The ease with which war games present such dualistic views can be seen in the 
practice of “modding,” the intentional and sometimes encouraged alteration of    
already written code in order to change the way that characters, buildings, and digital 
spaces look while leaving the procedural features of the previous game engine intact.  
One striking example of modding is Special Force 2, a Palestinian-produced game 
about the 2006 war in Lebanon between Israeli and Hezbollah.  The game is based 
on the Far Cry engine, an American-produced PC war first-person shooter involving 
bloody, violent battle.  Designers simply “modded” or “re-skinned” elements of the 
game like facial features, uniforms, and spatial settings for the conflicts, but retained 
the dualistic nature of the game’s programming.  In such cases, the imposition of a   
dualistic procedural rhetoric of hostility is simply transferred from one digital space 
to another, from one set of enemies to another.  This work is similar to the kind of 
“symbolic labor” that goes into “choosing, setting aside, consecrating, venerating, 
protecting, defending, and redefining” real life sacred spaces, since both digital and 
real-life sacred spaces are imbued with rich symbolic power (Chidester and 
Linenthal 17).  The symbolic activity of re-masking or “modding” as a mode of  
ideological discourse isn’t so far removed from the kinds of debates that raged in the 
use of sacred space in such real life sites as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem and the 
Babri Mosque in Ayodha, India. 
The magic circle of such games, exhibiting a predetermined dualistic worldview, 
is deliberately superimposed onto the space of real life, suggesting that either the 
game itself is not a game after all, or perhaps more problematically, that the space of 
real life, of war, is a game.  “Make belief” is in effect here with the dualism of the 
game as the foundational premise.  The preference to view reality in terms of win-
ners and losers is not altogether surprising, since “most games have an end in which 
one or more players achieve victory” (Salen and Zimmerman 258).  Games, as ritu-
als, almost always require us to think in terms of us and them.  The implications of 
such games for inhibiting interreligious and intercultural understanding are painfully 
obvious. 
The digital medium itself is “biased toward the discrete,” as Douglas Rushkoff 
warns us (52).  It favors pre-designated choices over complexity, decision over  
comprehension:  “Nothing in the real world is so very discrete, however.  We can’t 
even decide when life begins and ends, much less when a breath is complete or 
when the decay of a musical note’s echo has truly ended…  The digital realm is  
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biased toward choice, because everything must be expressed in the terms of a      
discrete, yes-or-no, symbolic language.  This, in turn, often forces choices on      
humans operating within the digital sphere” (55).  As Rushkoff puts it, “All of the 
messy stuff in between yes and no, on and off, just doesn’t travel down wires, 
through chips, or in packets” (56).  And where the digital realm maps onto or over 
the physical world, these kinds of decisions can be forced onto situations where        
a both–and approach might be more appropriate, where complexity must be           
recognized, where the solution is not checking a box or answering a question but 
listening, weighing, agonizing, and perhaps relinquishing choice altogether at times 
in favor of open-ended conversation. 
The Case of Kuma War  
 
The insidious relationship between violent media representation, video game    
dualism, and real life events can be seen in startling clarity in the case of Amir    
Mirzaei Hekmati, an Iranian-American marine who is currently being held in prison 
by Iranian authorities, accused of spying and producing video-game based anti-
Iranian propaganda.  In this case, the us-versus-them framework is reflected in both 
American-produced Islamophobic media and in Iranian, anti-American media.  The 
dialogue is expressed through a meta conversation taking place almost entirely  
within video games.  The circumscribed “sacred space” of the game’s world spilled 
over into real life, demanding a similar kind of dualism with heartbreaking          
consequences. 
First released in 2004, Kuma War is a series of first- and third-person tactical 
strategy games, most of which are based on recent events in Iraq.  Although Kuma 
War is not overtly religious, the game includes representations of mosques and    
sacred areas in its digital landscapes, and sometimes requires that players shoot   
enemies inside these sacred places.  The game purports to “accurately reconstruct 
real-war events from the news”; however, the games cannot be perfect “reconstruc-
tions” due to their programmed, procedurally-fixed nature.  Rather, they depict care-
fully selected and re-imagined locations, shaped by trajectories guided rigidly by the 
ideological worldview of their creators.  The game’s website includes over one   
hundred downloadable “missions,” many of which feature U.S. military personnel as 
guests who describe the “real” situation on the ground.  The means by which one 
“wins” the game is to violently occupy digital territory, which itself is modeled on 
real life spaces in Iraq.  The urge to “win” at such reality-inducing games is rooted in 
a desire to overcome ambiguity through a resolution achieved by a game design that 
sorts players and events into “good” and “bad,” into “winner” and “loser.”  Salen 
and Zimmerman argue that games are all about trying to achieve goals, which     
sustain players’ interest, their “engagement,” and their “desire”:  “Without a clear 
goal, meaningful game play is not possible.”  Players want to know how close or   
far they are away from winning, since otherwise “the game collapses into a        
jumbled heap of ambiguity” (258).  In the case of Kuma War, then, the “ambiguity” 
of real life is ported into the game, resolved, then exported as a violent plan of         
action. 
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The Kuma War games thrive on a clearly defined procedural rhetoric of “good 
guys” versus “bad guys,” laying this dualistic reality over real life spaces and events, 
encouraging players to see real history in this simplistic way.  I explain elsewhere 
about Kuma War’s dualistic depiction of the death of Muammar Qaddafi: 
The desire to translate events like Qaddafi’s and bin Laden’s 
deaths into video games is also part of what we might call         
algorithmic sorting: the cultural attempt to simplify complex    
historical and social issues into patterns that we can recognize and 
make sense of.  Typically, this is accomplished by vastly reducing 
the variables and historical contexts involved and effectively 
transforming lived events into games with predictable rules,      
defeatable “bad guys,” and the hopeful celebration of an “epic 
win.” (Wagner, “Will a Video Game Make Sense of Qaddafi’s 
Death?”) 
The situation has become increasingly controversial after Hekmati’s detainment.  In 
early January 2012, the Iranian government sentenced Hekmati to death.  According 
to Hekmati’s “confession,” he worked several years for the Defense Advanced    
Research Projects Agency of the U.S., after which records say he admitted to      
engaging in violent video game design as a means of creating propaganda: 
I was recruited by Kuma Games Company, a computer games 
company which received money from C.I.A. to design and    
make special films and computer games to change the public 
opinion’s mindset in the Middle East and distribute them among 
Middle East residents free of charge.  The goal of Kuma Games 
was to convince the people of the world and Iraq that what the 
U.S. does in Iraq and other countries is good and acceptable. 
(Mackey) 
According to the confession, which is disputed, Hekmati helped to compose several 
missions for Kuma War, including a mission depicting the killing of Osama bin  
Laden, another detailing an Afghan air strike, and most recently, the mission about 
the death of Muammar Qaddafi.  Admittedly, Hekmati’s involvement is not entirely 
unlikely, as “overlaps between the military and the game industry have grown   
ubiquitous” in recent years (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 101).  But he can hardly 
be held responsible for the dualistic worldview of the games, since this dynamic is 
built into all of the games since the company’s inception. 
However, the Kuma War controversy began long before Hekmati was arrested.  In 
2005, Kuma War released a mission called “Assault on Iran,” involving an imagined 
American military attack on the Nantanz uranium enrichment facility.  The game 
was met with an Iranian “mission” of the same video game, intended to pick up     
the storyline where “Assault on Iran” left off.  The 2007 Iranian game, “Special  
Operation 85: Hostage Rescue,” was produced by the Association of Islamic Unions 
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of Students as a response to Kuma War’s game mission.  The Iranian game depicts 
the rescue of a husband-and-wife team of Iranian nuclear engineers.  Gamers       
play as Iranian security forces on a mission that involves penetration of fortified 
locations in the attempt to free the Iranian engineers.  To win the game, players     
kill U.S. and Israeli soldiers in Israel and capture secret information from them 
(Dareinim). 
Not to be outdone, Kuma War responded with promises of a third installment, a 
videogame intended to pick up where the Iranian game left off.  “Assault on Iran, 
Part 3: Payback in Iraq,” again portrays the nuclear scientists, but in the American 
game they are now depicted as defectors.  According to a press release, Kuma War’s 
third installment was intended “to bring to the foreground key issues at stake in the 
current nuclear standoff and create a game-powered forum for frank dialogue on the 
real-world conflict.”  Indeed, Kuma War’s website describes “this kind of game-
based dialogue” with Iranian game-makers as “thrilling,” and invites their Iranian 
counterparts to pick up again where they leave off in the game’s meta-story.  The 
problem, of course, is that all versions of the game, Iranian and American, depend 
upon an us-versus-them model, with story resolution in every case dependent      
upon violence.  Furthermore, in all versions of the game, Iranian and American,     
the simplistic dualistic procedural rhetoric of the game is repeated with ritual       
intensity and mapped onto real-life events and spaces, suggesting in classic “this is 
not a game” form that real-life conflict can be reduced to simple algorithms of       
us-versus-them.  All versions of the game, then, function as a sort of conversation 
about values, with the depicted spaces within the games functioning as contested 
ideological  symbols, recursively transformed by successive game designers but     
all dualistic and all antagonistic, all urging “make belief” as a means to eliminate 
ambiguity. 
Although the American and Iranian versions of the game utilized different story-
lines, both can be reduced to the same procedural rhetoric of us-versus-them with a 
ritualized argument for victory through violent defeat of one’s enemies.  The “sacred 
spaces” of the games reflect an identical ritualized mode of engagement in a “magic 
circle” with real life spillover, the goal of which is to punish those who are different.  
Iranian accusations against Hekmati were as dualistic as the games that they accused 
him of engineering.  Hekmati could not be Iranian-American, and he could not have 
complex or divided loyalties.  Hekmati’s prosecutors decided, based on his work for 
an American gaming company, that he must be an enemy, and sentenced him to 
death for espionage.  As of today, Hekmati is still in prison awaiting retrial.  The 
Kuma War games, however, continue unabated. 
Conclusion  
 
We live in deeply wired spaces, so embedded with machines that we hardly notice 
them anymore.  In the past forty years, they have transformed our lives and, as    
media theorist Alexander Galloway notes, they have “precipitated massive          
upheavals in the lives of individuals submitted to a process of retaining and         
deployment into a new economy mediated by machines and other informatic      
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artifacts” (17).  But technology is not neutral. It is embedded with all the ideological 
limitations of the programmers who created it, who decided what choices we would 
have and which ones would not be offered to us. 
Religion and games have always relied upon some of the same modes of          
experience, namely the construction and circumscription of a “magic circle” or   
ritualized space in which fixed worldviews are rehearsed and rules of behavior are 
defined. Both too have situated these idealized experiences within permeable   
membranes, “magic circles” that exhibit give and take in a cultural and spatial     
context.  Both religion and games depend heavily upon formative ritual-like        
experiences to aid in the construction of meaning.  The “magic circle,” as a key  
concept for thinking about circumscribed spaces, reveals profoundly the ways in 
which games and rituals both mark off arenas of “play.”  Both demarcate certain 
areas as “sacred” or set apart, and both have the ability to invite projection of the 
values of the circumscribed space onto everyday reality.  The case studies here,   
especially the case of Hekmati, show that if we are not conscious about the values 
we instill in our gaming rituals and virtual “sacred spaces,” the results can be 
heartrending.  Furthermore, the dualistic perspectives embraced by opposing gaming 
communities can feed one another, reinforcing the apocalyptic mindset that identifies 
other human beings as only “friend” or “foe.”  Violent video games too easily invite 
“make belief” with antagonistic rules. 
The popularity of video games today reveals profoundly that human beings are 
persistently religious—we just change the way we express our religious needs.  Our 
deep fascination with all things digitized, with ordered programming available to us 
via our beloved devices, reveals a hunger for organization which itself betrays a  
bewilderment with bounty and a frequent retreat to easy dualisms.  Sacred spaces, as 
sites for powerful ideological negotiation, can be found in digital spaces as well as 
material ones.  We should, then, think very carefully about the games we play.    
Even if violent war-based games don’t urge violence directly, they run the risk of 
sanitizing it by presenting it as the only meaningful method for bringing order in the 
face of disagreement.  In our increasingly globalized and anxious world, we        
wish desperately for new rituals and experiences that allow us to map order onto 
seemingly chaotic real-life spaces.  We want something to believe, and we want  
discoverable rules with manifest purpose.  Games offer us just such comfort, but if 
the games we play the most are still the ones that dehumanize others, this order 
comes at a very high price indeed. 
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Notes  
 
1 For more on cyberspace as a proxy for religious notions of infinity, see Margaret 
Wertheim, The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace: A History of Space from Dante to the 
Internet (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.), 1999. 
2 Following gamer theorist McKenzie Wark, I use the term “gamer theory” to dis-
tinguish the study of games (especially videogames) from the older and more math-
ematical “game theory.” 
3 For more on how digital culture contributes to us-versus-them perspectives, see  
Wagner, Rachel, “First Person Shooter Religion: Algorithmic Culture and Inter-
Religious Encounter.” CrossCurrents, June (2012): 181-203. 
4 For more on this case, see Rachel Wagner, Godwired: Religion, Ritual and Virtu-
al Reality (Routledge, 2011), 172-176. 
5 Material cited here on Islamic videogames draws on shared research conducted 
with Ithaca College student Ranu Nath. 
6 See David Grossman, Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill: A Call to Action Against 
TV, Movie and Video Game Violence. New York: Random House, 1999. 
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